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ARTICLE
Big Things In Small Packages: Evaluating the
City of Berkeley’s Nanotechnology Ordinance
Effectiveness as a Model of Targeted
Transparency
DREW LERER

I.

INTRODUCTION

Nanotechnology continues to advance at a rapid pace,
appearing in a growing number of consumer products and
comprising an increasingly significant portion of the United
States’ economy. But for all their futuristic promise, some forms
of nanotechnology pose an environmental health threat, and have
been linked to lung cancer. Despite the real risk of harm, no
federal agency has adopted nanotechnology regulations to protect
human health and the environment. A diverse group of NGOs,
academics, and community activists support expeditious
regulation of the industry. Industry insiders are also concerned
by the slow progress of government oversight. They fear that by
not addressing environmental, health, and safety concerns, the
public trust will erode to the point that the economic and social
benefits of nanotechnology are occluded.
The City of Berkeley’s Engineered Nanoparticle Disclosure
Ordinance (BENDO) is the first and only city policy regulating
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nanotechnology in the nation.1
The BENDO follows a
transparency model requiring nanoparticle manufacturers and
handlers to disclose toxicological, environmental, and safety
information to the City’s Toxics Management Division.2 If
expanded to the state or national level, this model could be used
to create a uniform nanotechnology regulatory policy.3
The purpose of this article is threefold. First, a practical
ideal model of a nanotechnology disclosure policy is developed
based on relevant literature. Second, the BENDO is assessed
using the practical ideal type characteristics.
Finally,
recommendations to improve the BENDO are presented based on
the assessment.
II. BACKGROUND
Nanotechnology is the creation of structures of the size of 100
nanometers or smaller in any one dimension.4 For comparison, a
hair is approximately 80,000 nanometers wide while a typical
smallpox virus particle is roughly 300 nanometers in length.5
Materials reduced to the nanoscale can display novel properties
that are not present in the macroscale.6 For example, the same
chemical composition of silicon can emit different colors of light
depending upon its size.7 Nanotechnology’s novel properties offer
many environmental and commercial benefits including:

1. See CITY OF BERKELEY, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 15.12.010–15.12.170 (2008),
available at http://codepublishing.com/ca/berkeley/html/pdfs/Berkeley15.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Gary Marchant, Lincoln Professor of Emerging Tech., Law & Ethics, Ctr.
for the Study of Law, Sci. & Tech., Sandra Day O’Connor Coll. of Law, Speech at
Arizona State University: Emerging Technologies and the Environment (Sept.
10, 2007).
4. Nat’l Nanotech. Initiative, What’s So Special about the Nanoscale?,
NANO.GOV, http://www.nano.gov/nanotech-101/special (last visited Mar. 27,
2013).
5. Nat’l Nanotech. Initiative, Size of the Nanoscale, NANO.GOV,
http://www.nano.gov/nanotech-101/what/nano-size (last visited Mar. 27, 2013).
6. Nat’l Nanotech. Initiative, supra note 4.
7. Karlsruhe Inst. of Tech., Light From Silicon Nanocrystal LEDs, PHYS.ORG
(Feb. 18, 2013), http://phys.org/news/2013-02-silicon-nanocrystal.html.
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remediation of pollutants, solar energy technology, and the ability
to make stronger, lighter, and more fuel efficient vehicles.8
However, the benefits of nanotechnology do not come without
risk.
Recent research shows that carbon nanotubes share
carcinogenic properties with asbestos.9
Fullerenes, tiny
structures of carbon that resemble soccer balls, have been shown
to cause brain damage in aquatic animals.10 And quantum dots,
that hold the promise of targeted delivery of medicine, also pose
toxicological risks to human and environmental health.11 Novel
properties also mean that parent materials cannot be relied upon
to dictate the toxicological data of their nano-engineered
counterparts.12
For example, while carbon nanotubes may
increase the risk of mesothelioma, non-engineered carbon
particulates of similar size do not pose a similar risk.13
The White House describes nanotechnology as leading to the
“next industrial revolution.”14 According to Lux Research, by the
year 2014, 15% of all commercial products world-wide will
incorporate nanotechnology with a combined economic value of
over one trillion dollars.15 Unfortunately, research into the
environmental and health effects of nanotechnology has not kept
up with the growth of the commercial industry. In 2005, through
the National Nanotechnology Initiative, the U.S. Government

8. Nat’l Nanotech. Initiative, supra note 4.
9. Craig A. Poland et al., Carbon Nanotubes Introduced into the Abdominal
Cavity of Mice Show Asbestos-like Pathogenicity in a Pilot Study, 3 NATURE
NANOTECH. 423, 423 (2008).
10. Eva Oberdörster, Manufactured Nanomaterials (Fullerenes, C60) Induce
Oxidative Stress in the Brain of Juvenile Largemouth Bass, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSP. 1058, 1058 (2004).
11. Ron Hardman, A Toxicologic Review of Quantum Dots: Toxicity Depends
on Physicochemical and Environmental Factors 114 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 165,
171 (2006).
12. Morteza Mahmoudi et al., Assessing the in vitro and in vivo toxicity of
superparamagnetic iron oxide nanoparticles, 112 CHEM. REVS. 2323 (2011).
13. Poland et al., supra note 9, at 425.
14. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE—
LEADING TO THE NEXT INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, INTERAGENCY 46 (2011), available
at http://www.ostp.gov/NSTC/html/iwgn/iwgn.fy01budsuppl/nni.pdf.
15. LUX RES., STATEMENT OF FINDINGS: SIZING NANOTECHNOLOGY'S VALUE
CHAIN 1 (2004).
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invested over one billion dollars in nanotechnology research with
less than eleven million earmarked for risk related research.16
The dearth of toxicological information and lack of standard
risk assessment protocols make it difficult to determine the
adverse effects of engineered nano-sized materials on biologic
systems. The large gaps in knowledge may be slowing down the
regulatory process.17 As of 2006, an estimated 700 types of
nanomaterials are being manufactured at about 800 facilities in
the United States; yet, no agency has developed safety rules
specific to nanomaterials.18 J. Clarence Davies, co-creator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has called for a new
federal agency to conduct research and perform regulatory
oversight of the nano-industry.19 He argues that the current
federal regulatory agencies already “suffer from under-funding
and bureaucratic ossification. . . .”20 “[Agencies] will require more
than just increased funding and minor rule changes to deal
adequately with the potential adverse effects of the new
technologies . . . and many of these changes will take a decade or
more to accomplish. . . .”21
At the same time, local and state agencies are taking action
now to fill in the gaps of nano oversight, as illustrated by the
Woodrow Wilson Institute’s Project on Emerging Nanotechnology
(PEN).
PEN’s Suellen Keiner writes that this bottom-up
approach could serve as a “laboratory for democracy” by providing
the federal government with a proof of concept for regulatory
oversight.22 Local disclosure regulations could also provide data
16. ANDREW D. MAYNARD, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, A
RESEARCH STRATEGY FOR ADDRESSING RISK 3 (2006), available at http://www.
nanotechproject.org/ file_download/files/PEN3_Risk.pdf.
17. J. CLARENCE DAVIES, OVERSIGHT OF NEXT GENERATION NANOTECHNOLOGY
13 (2008).
18. Christine M. Pense & Stephen H. Cutcliffe, Risky Talk: Framing the
Analysis of the Social Implications of Nanotechnology, 27 BULL. SCI., TECH. &
SOC’Y 349, 354 (2007).
19. DAVIES, supra note 17, at 3 (calling for “a new federal Department of
Environmental and Consumer Protection”).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See generally SUELLEN KEINER, ROOM AT THE BOTTOM? POTENTIAL STATE
AND LOCAL STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF
NANOTECHNOLOGY (2008).
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for environmental and safety standards as well as thresholds for
nanoparticle toxicity exposure. Keiner identifies California as
being one of five states most able to launch initiatives for
overseeing safe and responsible development of nanotechnology.23
The Toxics Management Division (TMD) is the regulatory agency
within the City of Berkeley that is responsible for implementation
of the BENDO.24
The BENDO, enacted in 2006, is the first law in the nation
that addresses environmental health and safety issues related to
nanotechnology.25 Based on its authority under Chapter 6.95 of
the California Health and Safety Code,26 the Berkeley City
Council amended its municipal code to require facilities that
manufacture or use engineered nanoparticles to disclose
toxicological as well as pollution and exposure prevention
information.27
Any facility that manufactures or handles nanomaterials is
subject to the regulatory disclosure requirements.28
Retail
businesses that sell consumer goods that contain nanomaterials
are exempt from the regulatory requirement.29 Examples of
consumers goods that may contain nanomaterials are ultra-light
bicycle frames, titanium dioxide based sun screen, and odor
eating socks that use nano-sized silver particles as anti-microbial
agents.30 At the time the BENDO was enacted, there were only
four facilities operating in Berkeley that manufactured
nanoparticles.31
Two of the facilities, Bayer Healthcare
Pharmaceuticals and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratories,

23. Id. at 8.
24. Id. at 21.
25. Javiera Barandiaran, The Berkeley City Ordinance on Nanotechnology:
Shortcomings, Improvements, and Implications for Risk Governance 4 (Mar. 11,
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://step.berkeley.edu/White
_Paper/Barandiaran.pdf.
26. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 6.95 (West 2010).
27. KEINER, supra note 22, at 19.
28. Interview with Nabil Al-Hadithy, Sec’y, City of Berkeley Cmty. Envtl.
Advisory Comm’n, in Berkeley, Cal. (June 4, 2010).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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are among the largest employers in the City, with 1,500 and
4,000 workers respectively.32
The City does not provide forms or a template for businesses
to fill out, nor does it specify the format in which information
must be submitted. The majority of submissions reviewed employ
a narrative, business letter format. Reporting requirements of
the BENDO are categorized as follows:
• Characterization: particle dimensions, mass, phase33
• Toxicology: exposure pathways, mutagenicity,
bioaccumulation34
• Occupational Safety: personal protective equipment,
engineering controls, spill mitigation35
The
BENDO’s
disclosure
framework
is
unique—
distinguished from more traditional, command and control
regulation—in several ways, as exemplified by the criterion set
forth by Fung and O’Rourke.36 First, in contrast to setting and
enforcing standards on nanotechnology producers, the BENDO
primarily aims to provide private citizens, interest groups, and
firms with relevant information related to production volume, life
cycle, and environmental health and safety.37
Second,
environmental requirements such as toxicological thresholds,
exposure monitoring, and disposal analysis, are not initially
determined by risk assessment and toxicological metrics; instead,
the desired outcome of the BENDO is for firms to adopt
environmental safety measures in response to a dynamic range of
public pressures.38 Finally, rather than the creation of agency
32. Id.
33. CITY

OF BERKELEY, CAL. TOXICS MGMT. DIV., MANUFACTURED NANOSCALE
MATERIALS HEALTH & SAFETY DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES 2 (2011), available at
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/uploadedFiles/Planning_and_Development/Level_3
_-_Toxics/Nanoscale%20Reporting%20Guidelines%202011.pdf.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Archon Fung & Dara O'Rourke, Reinventing Environmental Regulation
from the Grassroots Up: Explaining and Expanding the Success of the Toxics
Release Inventory, 25 ENVTL. MGMT. 115 (1998).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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standards or government sanctions, public pressure focuses on
those who do not conform to the acceptable standard to induce
them to adopt more effective environmental practices.39
Disclosure laws, like those put forth in the BENDO, have
notable benefits compared to coercive, command and control
regulations. For instance, they are relatively inexpensive to draft
and implement.40 Furthermore, they can serve as vehicles for
gathering data that can in turn inform the creation of
Finally, the laws can
environmental safety standards.41
simultaneously support the improvement of environmental
quality and the democratic belief in the public’s right to know
about environmental risks associated with the products and
services they consume.42 This last point especially illustrates
that disclosure laws are more politically feasible than coercive
regulations. However, there are also shortcomings to taking the
disclosure law approach. In the absence of effective planning,
strategic execution, and sound politics, transparency’s
effectiveness can be compromised.43 In addition, it can be
challenging to measure the success or failure of disclosure laws.44
Given the explosive economic growth projected for
nanomaterials, manufacturers of nanomaterials have an
economic incentive to protect their intellectual property related to
their research and development while satisfying the information
requirements of the BENDO. The BENDO incorporates the trade
secret protections mandated by the Hazardous Materials
Reporting section of the California Health and Safety Code.45

39. Id.
40. Hua Wang, Environmental Information Disclosure, in GUIDANCE NOTES
ON TOOLS FOR POLLUTION MANAGEMENT § 2.1.9, 5 (World Bank Grp. 2008).
41. Id.
42. David Weil, Professor, Bos. Univ. Sch. of Mgmt., Presentation at the
Federal Trade Commission Conference on Consumer Information and the
Mortgage Market: Promise and Pitfalls of Transparency: Insights for the
Mortgage Market Crisis (May 29, 2008).
43. See generally RICARDO CRUZ PRIETO, TRANSATLANTIC CONFERENCE ON
TRANSPARENCY RESEARCH, ON THE DISADVANTAGES OF TRANSPARENCY FOR
GOVERNMENT: REFLECTIONS ON SOME ARGUMENTS AGAINST TRANSPARENCY AS A
DEMOCRATIC REFORM STRATEGY (2012).
44. Fung & O’Rourke, supra note 36, at 123.
45. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25251–25257.1 (West 2012).
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Information determined to be trade secrets is protected from
public disclosure and required to be kept under lock and key.46
III. ELEMENTS OF SUCCESSFUL TARGETED
TRANSPARENCY
This Section reviews the research of Archon Fung, Mary
Graham, and David Weil on targeted transparency in order to
construct a framework for evaluating the design and
implementation of the BENDO. This Section discusses the
definition of targeted transparency, along with the benefits and
risks of implementing a targeted transparency program. Next,
practical ideal type elements that are common to successful
targeted transparency programs are identified. This Section
concludes with an operationalization table of the conceptual
framework that will be used to assess the BENDO.
A. Targeted Transparency: An Emerging Regulatory
Model
Government transparency is essential to an informed
citizenry and democracy. The Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)47 creates a broad statute for insuring openness in
government. Recent efforts have expanded the concept of sun
lighting information and applied it to achieving more specific
regulatory goals.48 The mandate to disclose information is no
longer limited to government but extends to corporations and
other organizations.49 The result of this evolution is what Archon
Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil call “targeted
transparency”—the use of publicly required disclosure of
information in a standardized format to achieve a clear public

46. Id.
47. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
48. David Hess, Social Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The
Prospects of Achieving Corporate Accountability Through Transparency, 17 BUS.
L.Q. 453, 454 (2007), available at http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/dwhess/
Hess_BEQ%202007_Social%20Reporting%20and%20New%20Gov%20Reg.pdf.
49. Id.
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purpose.50 Unlike the calls for transparency in all aspects of
government, targeted transparency is grounded in the very
selective disclosure of information from specific actors that are
not necessarily limited to government.
Targeted transparency is gaining popularity with policy
makers for many reasons.
For one, it is cheaper and—
politically—less controversial than standards-based regulatory
requirements. It leverages the will of the citizenry rather than
the government to achieve its objectives, thus responding to the
growing criticism of the government’s ability to solve problems on
its own with expensive funding or traditional regulation. Finally,
targeted transparency may be more easily applied to problems
that cannot easily be defined, vary by locale, or are characterized
by wide differences in concern amongst citizenry.51
Since 1996, the federal government has adopted over 150
targeted transparency policies to address such diverse concerns
as SUV rollovers, public school performance, financial integrity of
banks, worker safety, and environmental pollution.52 The 1984
chemical release in Bhopal, India that killed thousands of people
instigated U.S. Congress to pass the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA).53 Perhaps the
most well-known of all of the environment targeted transparency
laws, EPCRA supports emergency planning for state and local
governments and provides citizenry and local governments with
information concerning chemical hazards present in their
community.54 The BENDO applies many of the same policy goals
of EPCRA to nanoparticles.

50. ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE
PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2007) [hereinafter FUNG ET AL.]; see also
David Weil, Targeted Transparency, in ADVANCING EXCELLENCE AND PUBLIC
TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 77, 77 (Cal Clark & Don-Terry Veal eds., 2011).
51. See generally FUNG ET AL., supra note 50.
52. Id. at 20.
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2012); LINDA-JO SCHIEROW, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL 32683, THE EMERGENCY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW
ACT (EPCRA): A SUMMARY 1 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/RL32683.pdf.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050.
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Targeted transparency considers two types of stakeholders:
information disclosers and information users.55 Information
disclosers are those required to provide information in the specific
format that the policy dictates, and who policymakers target to
effect behavioral change.56 Information users draw upon the
information that they find relevant in an effort to inform their
choices.57 The targeted transparency policy has an effect when
the information enters the decision making process of users and
influences their decisions.58 This in turn affects disclosure
behavior in what Fung, Graham, and Weil term the “Action
Cycle.”59
In the case of the BENDO, there is a diverse group of both
information disclosers and information users.
Since
nanotechnology spans different industries, the BENDO disclosers
include federal research laboratories, drug manufacturers,
manufacturers of consumer cosmetics, and higher education
institutions.60 Information users are also diverse, with different
incentives for using information.
They include: emergency
responders, toxic reduction advocacy groups, property
speculators, neighborhood groups, and—because of the
uniqueness of the ordinance itself—other policy makers, and
policy researches.61 Thus, a diversity of interests is represented
by each user. The stakeholders in the City of Berkeley are
largely representative of the state of California as a whole and
perhaps the nation. This is important when considering the
feasibility of using the BENDO as a model for a larger audience.

55. David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25 J.
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155, 156 (2005).
56. Id. at 157.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 158.
59. Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of Transparency: What Makes
Disclosure Policies Effective? 4 (Ash Inst. for Democratic Governance &
Innovation, Working Paper No. 12, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=766287.
60. Interview with Nabil Al-Hadithy, supra note 28.
61. Id.
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B. Evaluating the BENDO: A Conceptual Framework
Based on a review of the relevant literature, the conceptual
framework used to evaluate the effectiveness of the BENDO
consists of the following categories:










Extent to which policy fills an information gap62
Accuracy of information63
Cost and resources64
Enforcement65
User embeddedness66
Discloser embeddedness67
Feedback and evaluation mechanism68
Involvement of user groups69
Extent to which existing regulatory programs are
leveraged70

All elements of the framework identified above are taken
from the literature. The remainder of this section draws upon
this literature to provide an examination and justification of the
elements of a successful nanoparticle transparency policy.
C. Extent to Which Policy Fills an Information Gap
Before we can begin to evaluate the effectiveness of the
BENDO, we must first establish whether the goals of the policy
problem it seeks to address are compatible with targeted
transparency.
Targeted transparency assumes that an
information gap is somehow contributing to the regulatory

62. FUNG ET AL., supra note 50, at 174.
63. Id. at 178.
64. Edward P. Weber, Successful Collaboration: Negotiating Effective
Regulations, 40 ENV’T: SCI. & POL’Y FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 11, 12 (1998).
65. FUNG ET AL., supra note 50, at 39.
66. Fung et al., supra note 59, at 10-13.
67. Id. at 13-15.
68. Id. at 20.
69. Id. at 7-9.
70. Weber, supra note 64, at 13.
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problem. In order for targeted transparency to be effective, the
nature of the information gap should be known.71 One way to
determine the nature of the information gap and its relation to
risk is to perform a risk assessment.72 Thus, policymakers should
ask how bridging the information gap reduces risk.
D. Information Accuracy
For information to be of value it must adhere to a standard of
accuracy.73
There are four junctures where there are
opportunities for data to become inaccurate. The first is initial
data entry.74 This can occur because of typos, poor data entry
forms, or poor training of the data-entry staff.75 The second
source of data inaccuracy, called “data movement,” is a result of
mistakes made when extracting or loading data into a secondary
data source.76 Many data entry errors occur when the initial data
is entered on paper and then entered manually into a secondary
computer database.77 The third source of inaccuracy is when
data reports, spreadsheets, query results, or summaries are
generated from the database.78 If the person extracting the
information does not understand the data map, fields, and data
dictionary then inaccurate information can be drawn from
accurate data.79 Data decay occurs when data is not updated;
data must be reviewed to ensure that it is accurate over time.80
E. Costs and Resources
For transparency policies to be sustainable they need to have
a steady funding source, seeing as regulations that are
underfunded tend to have higher rates of noncompliance than

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

FUNG ET AL., supra note 50, at 174.
Id.
Id. at 109.
JACK E. OLSON, DATA QUALITY: THE ACCURACY DIMENSION 34 (2002).
Id.
Id. at 52-62.
Id.
Id. at 50.
Id.
OLSON, supra note 74, at 50.
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funded mandates.81 However, because estimating the costs of
these policies can be difficult, fee schedules should be structured
in a way that they can adapt to changes within the industry.82
F. Enforcement
Voluntary disclosure is only as good as the commitment of
the disclosers because it requires no enforcement. On the other
hand, effective targeted transparency requires a robust
enforcement program and the ability to levy sanctions against
Enforcement actions should be
noncompliant parties.83
publicized for maximum exposure and to act as a deterrent to
noncompliant actors.
Enforcement that collects monetary
penalties can also be used as a funding source to reduce costs.
G. User Embeddedness
Even if we assume that targeted transparency creates a new
body of publicly accessible information, how the users make
decisions with that information depends on a number of factors.
When new information becomes part of a user’s decision making
routing it becomes what Weil et al. calls “embedded.”84 According
to Weil et al., the following three factors are key as to whether a
transparency policy becomes embedded in user’s decision making
routines:




The information’s perceived value in achieving user’s
goals85
The information’s compatibility with user’s decision
making routines86
The information’s comprehensibility87

81. James R. St. George, Unfunded Mandates: Balancing State and National
Needs, 13 BROOKINGS REV. 12, 12-15 (1995).
82. Weil et al., supra note 55, at 156.
83. FUNG ET AL., supra note 50, at 45.
84. Weil et al., supra note 55, at 155-56.
85. Id. at 159-62.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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How users value information depends on a number of
dynamic factors.
Each user may determine the value of
information differently and for different choices.88 For example, a
new home buyer may use information based on the toxic release
inventory to determine if there are polluters in his prospective
neighborhood. A local government agency may use the same
information to amend zoning ordinances. Someone who is not
concerned about the effects of airborne contaminants on his or
her health may not value the information at all.
Similarly, additional information may not help users for
whom there are limited choices available.89 An out-of-work
factory worker may not have the luxury of changing jobs even if
he is concerned about the level of chemical hazards present in his
work place. Affordable housing may only exist in areas where
pollution emissions are high thus being the primary limiting
factor of low-income home buyers. The value of the information
to these users would be low since it would not have much effect
on their decision making process.
In addition to information needing to be of value to users, it
must also be compatible with the information user’s decision
making routines.90 According to Fung, Graham, and Weil,
compatibility consists of two components: format, and time and
place of availability.91 Format can be used to mitigate complexity
into a simpler system such as grading from A-F or a star rating
system.92 Time and place of availability refers to where and
when the information is accessible to users.93 The restaurant
grading system of Los Angeles County serves as a prime example
of having an easy to understand format and—by posting the
grade on the restaurant window—the temporal and spatial
availability of the system.94
Value and compatibility are not always enough to ensure
that information becomes embedded in user decisions.
If
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 173.
Weil et al., supra note 55, at 161.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 169.
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information is not comprehensible users may not understand how
to use it to their benefit.95 User groups, face a difficult balancing
act between providing information that is too technical or too
simplistic, since information that is too technical can exclude
users who might otherwise benefit from the information and
information that is too simplistic may leave out pertinent
information.96 For instance, the Material Safety Data Sheets
(MSDS) that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) requires be made available to workers are filled with
technical jargon that the majority of workers do not
understand.97 While OSHA requires that employers provide
MSDSs to their employees, they do not require that their
employees understand the MSDSs.98 In addition, OSHA does not
require that chemical manufactures publish MSDSs with user
comprehensibility in mind.99
H. Disclosure Embeddedness
Disclosers also have to be embedded in order for
transparency policies to be most effective. Even if transparency
policies successfully change user decisions, for long-term
sustainability, disclosers’ behavior must also be altered.100 Thus,
the results of user decisions need to be communicated to the
disclosers so that the users have the potential to change the
behavior of the disclosers, in line with policy goals.101 In the case
of the BENDO, it means that producers of nanotechnology—the
disclosers—will take steps to reduce risks as a result of user
decision making.

95. FUNG ET AL., supra note 50, at 59.
96. Id. at 59-60.
97. Weil et al., supra note 55, at 172.
98. Charles C. Phillips et al., The Efficacy of Material Safety Data Sheets and
Worker Acceptability, 30 J. SAFETY RES. 113, 113-14 (1999).
99. Id.
100. Weil et al., supra note 55, at 161.
101. Id.
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Feedback and Evaluation Mechanism

In the current information age new metrics, benchmarks, and
analysis are being produced at an exponential growing rate.
Because transparency policies depend on the quality of the
information they collect, they are prone to becoming outdated
unless they are consistently reviewed, evaluated, and updated.102
Therefore, effective policies tend to create requirements for
frequent evaluation, feedback, and policy revision.103 This serves
to not only promote adaptation to changing circumstances but
also foster user and discloser participation by giving them a
vested interest in the policy’s future.104
J.

Involvement of User Groups

Transparency policies are strengthened when user groups
take an active interest in supporting them. By publicizing,
translating, and promoting information exchange, user groups
can compensate for weaknesses that may be inherent in the
policy itself.105
The technical complexities of the MSDSs
discussed earlier are often mitigated by labor unions that
translate and disseminate hazardous chemical exposure
information to their members.106 Though the Federal Toxic
Release Inventory is difficult for lay people to understand, the
data is routinely summarized and publicized by news media
outlets and bloggers.107 Policy makers should be aware of the
positive role of user groups and take steps to promote their
involvement.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

FUNG ET AL., supra note 50, at 176-77.
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id. at 177.
Phillips et al., supra note 98, at 113-14.
FUNG ET AL., supra note 50, at 162.
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K. Extent to which Existing Regulatory Programs are
Leveraged
Whenever possible, transparency policies should leverage
existing programs to achieve policy goals.108 Existing programs
economize staffing resources, fill in deficiencies such as
enforcement and sanctions, and keep costs down. The restaurant
hygiene grading system of Los Angeles County would not work
without a health inspection system, nor should it be thought of as
a replacement for that system.109 Because targeted transparency
is a complement and not a replacement for other forms of public
intervention, it is important that they work in tandem with other
government policies.110
IV. METHODOLOGY
This research draws on document analysis and structured
interviews, using as a case study the BENDO regulatory process.
A discussion of the documents and interviews used in the
analysis follows. The weaknesses of the study are discussed as
well.
The case study research method was used to assess the
BENDO against a model program developed from reviewing the
literature. Robert K. Yin defines case study research as a
“research strategy . . . used in many situations to contribute to
our knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social,
political, and related phenomena.”111
Case study was the
preferred method of comparing the BENDO to an ideal model.
According to Earl Babbie, triangulation involves “[t]he use of
several different research methods to test the same finding. . .
.”112
Triangulation is important because every method of
research has strengths and weaknesses, which may have an

108. Telephone Interview with Archon Fung, Professor of Pub. Policy, John F.
Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ. (Aug. 13, 2008).
109. Weil et al., supra note 55, at 169-70.
110. Id. at 169.
111. ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 1 (3d ed.
2011).
112. EARL R. BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 118 (12th ed. 2010).
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effect on the findings.113 Yin concurs that “[a]ny finding or
conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more convincing
and accurate if it is based on several different sources of
information. . . .”114 In fact, triangulation is one of the strengths
of case study research.
Several data collection mechanisms were used in this study.
First, focused interviews of users and disclosers elicited data on
the BENDO. Second, document analysis was conducted of the
Berkeley Toxics Management’s policies and procedure manual,
Community Environmental Advisory Commission (CEAC), and
Berkeley City Council meeting minutes. Finally, data from
agency reports to California EPA (CUPA to state reports), agency
self-audits, BENDO disclosure submissions, and Berkeley facility
hazardous materials disclosures were used to supplement the
focused interviews.
Focused interviews both clarify information from the
literature review and provide perspective on the roles of each
actor. Many interview questions pertained to the practical ideal
elements of an effective transparency disclosure policy. As
established earlier, the ideal elements of a transparency
disclosure policy come from the research of Archon Fung, Mary
Graham, and David Weil of the Transparency Policy Project.
Other elements were derived from the Project on Emerging
Nanotechnologies (PEN).
A. Operationalization
Operationalizing links the practical ideal type categories to
the data collection methods.
Table 1 indicates how the
conceptual framework is linked to these data collection methods:
document analysis, archival data, and focused interviews. For
example, the interview questions are constructed using the
concepts found within the categories.115

113. Id.
114. ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 92 (2d ed.
1994).
115. For focused interview instruments, see infra Appendix A and Appendix B.
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Table 1: Operationalizing the Conceptual Framework
Element
Focused
Document
Archival
Interview
Analysis
Data
Question
Extent to which policy
A7, A8
CEAC
fills an information gap
Minutes
A bridgeable
information gap
contributes to public
risk
Nature of information
gap is known
Bridging the
information gap
reduces risk
Accuracy of information A35, A36
BENDO
Regulatory
Guidelines
Cost and resources
A20, A21, B6
CUPA to
Cost is not prohibitive
A20, A21
State Reports
Agency has adequate
A30, B8
resources
Agency minimizes
economic disincentives
to disclosers
Enforcement
A18, A19
TMD Policies CUPA to
and
State Reports,
Procedures
Self-Audit
User Embeddedness
A6, A11-A16, CEAC
Self-Audit
The information’s
A23, A24,
Minutes
BENDO
perceived value in
A26
City Council
Submissions
achieving user goals
Minutes
CUPA to
The information’s
State Reports
compatibility with user
decision making
routines
The information’s
comprehensibility
Discloser
A8, A38, B3,
CUPA to
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Embeddedness
Impact of user
decisions on discloser
goals
Ability to discern
changes in user
behavior
Information disclosers
can reduce risks
Evaluation Mechanism
There is an evaluation
process of the policy
Results of evaluation
are incorporated into
policy
Results strengthen user
groups
Policy leverages
existing regulatory
programs
Communication
between regulators,
users, and disclosers is
practical

B8

A34

[Vol. 30
State Reports,
Self-Audit

TMD Policies
and
Procedures

A33
A3, A17

CEAC
Minutes

A23, B5

BENDO
disclosure
submittals
CUPA to
State Reports,
Self Audit

V. RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Through document analysis and focused interviews, this
assessment reveals which elements of the practical ideal
transparency policy model the BENDO is currently embracing,
and which elements need to be implemented or improved upon.
A. Extent to Which Policy Fills an Information Gap
The City of Berkeley created the BENDO in direct response
to the dearth of environmental health and safety information on
engineered nanoparticles, a lack that was deemed as a risk to
emergency responders and city planning decision makers. The
City conducted a comprehensive review of literature to evaluate
this information gap and to determine the extent of the risk
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posed.116 Thus, the BENDO was implemented to fill this
information gap and reduce the risks associate with the
information gap. Still, a weakness of the BENDO is that it only
requires facilities to submit information that is known. The
BENDO regulatory guidelines suggest that facilities take a
precautionary approach in regards to management of
nanoengineered particles where health and safety information is
not known.117 However, it does not require facilities to take
specific action to conduct research to fill these information
gaps.118
To further strengthen the BENDO, TMD should incorporate
an ongoing assessment of how the risk is being mitigated by the
information that the BENDO provides.
Table 2: Extent to Which Policy Fills an Information Gap
Ideal Type Category
Interview Document
Summary
Analysis
Nature of information gap Yes
Yes
City met with
known
subject matter
experts and
conducted a
literature
review to
determine
nature of
information gap
and risk.
Goals of policy problem
Yes
Yes
Purpose of the
consistent with targeted
BENDO is to
transparency.
require
disclosure of
information.
Recommendation: TMD should incorporate a regular
assessment of how the risk is being mitigated by the BENDO.

116. Interview with Nabil Al-Hadithy, Sec’y, City of Berkeley Cmty. Envtl.
Advisory Comm’n, in Berkeley, Cal. (Oct. 15, 2010).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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B. Information Accuracy
BENDO submittals from facilities are stored in paper form in
the TMD offices. There is no translation of data from paper to
electronic form. TMD has not yet compiled the data in the
submittals or created any reports that draw from the data.119
Although TMD reviews the BENDO submittal for
completeness, it does not ensure that the data is accurate.120
Part of the reason is that TMD staff do not have the technical
expertise to verify the novel toxicological data.121 The other
reason is that requiring facilities to report data significantly
drains TMD’s resources.122 As the program matures, resources
should be directed towards ensuring information accuracy at the
facility level.
Table 3: Information Accuracy
Ideal Type Category
Interview
Source Data

Summary

TMD does not
insure data
accuracy at the
facility level.
Data Movement
N/A
N/A
TMD does not
move data to a
secondary
source.
Data Reporting
N/A
N/A
TMD does not
create reports
with data.
Recommendation: BENDO should adopt a procedure for
auditing facility submittals for information accuracy.

119.
120.
121.
122.

No

Document
Analysis
N/A

Id.
Id.
Id.
Interview with Nabil Al-Hadithy, supra note 116.
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C. Cost and Resources
The BENDO is funded directly from facilities that engineer
or handle engineered nanoparticles. These fees are applied when
the facility submits a disclosure document. TMD staff bills the
facility $150 an hour to review the submittal.123
TMD has not recovered the money it invested in staff
resources into implementation of the BENDO. According to TMD
financial records, approximately 400 billable hours were
dedicated to the process of implementation.124 The City’s general
fund paid for this effort. TMD records also indicate that there is
no money budgeted to support the BENDO beyond the hourly
charge for BENDO data entry and administrative processes.125
Furthermore, TMD’s Fee Schedule is approved by city council on
a biannual basis. Changes to the Fee Schedule can be made if
they are approved by the City.126
Bayer is one of the largest employers in Berkeley and the
largest company that produces nanoparticles.127 In regards to
discloser costs, Bayer’s costs have been minimal compared to the
resources they spent on maintaining compliance with other
regulatory programs.128 Mr. Bowman stated that approximately
five hours of staff time was used creating the BENDO
submittal.129
Seeing as the BENDO needs a stable funding source to be
successful into the future, TMD should perform a cost analysis to
determine how sustainable the current funding mechanism is and
whether it is sufficient for cost recovery.
123. CITY OF BERKELEY, CAL. TOXICS MGMT. DIV., CHAPTER D – CERTIFIED
UNIFORM AGENCY: FEE SCHEDULE (2012), available at http://www.ci.berkeley.
ca.us/uploadedFiles/Planning_and_Development/Level_3__Toxics/Fee%20Sched
ule(1).pdf.
124. Interview with Nabil Al-Hadithy, Sec’y, City of Berkeley Cmty. Envtl.
Advisory Comm’n, in Berkeley, Cal. (Sept. 15, 2012).
125. City of Berkeley, Cal. Toxics Mgmt. Div., Toxics Management Division
Budget (July 1, 2010) (on file with City of Berkeley, Cal. Toxics Management
Division).
126. Id.
127. Telephone Interview with Geoff Bowman, Health & Safety Chief, Bayer
Corp. (Sept. 29, 2012).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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Table 4: Cost and Resources
Ideal Type Category
Interview
Steady Funding Source

Somewhat

Document
Analysis
Somewhat

[Vol. 30

Summary

While TMD has
a funding
source for
submittal
reviews they
rely on the
City’s general
fund to cover
other program
costs.
Fees can change with
Yes
Yes
Fee Schedule
industry
can change if it
is approved by
city council
Recommendation: TMD should perform a cost analysis to
determine if the funding mechanism is sufficient for cost
recovery and is sustainable.

D. Enforcement
TMD has a number of tools to enforce the BENDO. As the
BENDO is a city ordinance, violation of any provision of the city
ordinance is subject to administrative citation.130 If a facility
does not comply, it is sent a warning letter issuing a violation and
a time frame for compliance.131 If the deadline passes, the facility
is subject to an administrative citation with a penalty of up to
$500 per day.132 The City Attorney is authorized to take further
action such as revoking the facility’s zoning certificate or placing
a lien on the property.133 In addition, the enforcement may be

130.
131.
132.
133.

Interview with Nabil Al-Hadithy, supra note 124.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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publicized through a press release based on the discretion of the
TMD manager.134
There have not been any cases of enforcement for
noncompliance since the BENDO was enacted in 2006.135
Table 5: Enforcement
Ideal Type Category

Interview

Robust Enforcement
Program

Yes

Document
Analysis
Yes

Enforcement Actions
Publicized

Yes

N/A

Summary
TMD has a
robust
enforcement
policy with the
ability to levy
fines and revoke
permits.
Enforcement
actions can be
publicized
through a press
release.

Recommendations: None

E. User Embeddedness
a.

Information’s Perceived Value in Achieving User
Goals

The BENDO has a number of different users including policy
analysts, academics, and the media. These users are interested
in the BENDO because it provides value as a case study for local
nanoparticle regulatory efforts. Berkeley citizens may take
interest in the BENDO because of their concern for their health.
Finally, City staff use the BENDO for city planning and
emergency response decision making.

134. Id.
135. CITY OF BERKELEY, CAL. TOXICS MGMT. DIV., ENFORCEMENT CASES (20062010) (on file with City of Berkeley, Cal. Toxics Management Division).
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The document analysis reveals that lay people are not
accessing the BENDO data as frequently as professional users.
This suggests that the BENDO is not meeting the needs of the
private citizenry, a user group to which the BENDO was designed
to cater.
Table 6: Public Record Reviews Berkeley BENDO 2006-2009136
User Group
Number of Requests
Journalist
6
Academic
13
Public Agency
8
Private Citizen
1

b.

Compatibility with User’s Decision-Making
Routines

Compatibility of information with user decision-making
routines is determined by time and place.137 BENDO data is not
electronic, as data is kept in TMD paper files. A file review
request must be submitted before the data can be retrieved. Files
are not available remotely and are not sent by fax or PDF to
users. TMD should consider making the information available
online to users as this would reduce the time and cost to obtain
this information and make it available to a larger audience.
Furthermore, the data submissions are not standardized.
The disparate format of the submittals makes it difficult to
compare data. TMD should either standardize submittals by
providing a formatted template or synthesize data into a form
that allows easy comparison of data.

136. CITY OF BERKELEY, CAL. TOXICS MGMT. DIV., BENDO RECORDS (20062009), available at http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/uploadedFiles/Planning_and_
Development/Level_3_-_Toxics/File%20Review%20rev031912.pdf (providing the
form to submit for public access to Toxics Management Division records, as
reviewed by the author).
137. Weil et al., supra note 55, at 169.
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Comprehensibility

BENDO submittals are technical in nature, containing
information on toxicology, engineering controls, and chemical
properties. While these submittals may be comprehensible to
those with technical knowledge of nanotechnology, they may not
be as comprehensible to lay users—such as citizens wanting to
know the risks of living close to a facility that generates
nanoparticles.
TMD should thus consider simplifying
information or actively encouraging user groups who can provide
this service.

Table 7: User Embeddedness
Ideal Type Category
Interview
Information’s Perceived
Value in Achieving User
Goals

Somewhat

Document
Analysis
Somewhat

Summary

It is likely that
professional
users achieve
more value
from BENDO
data than lay
persons.
Compatibility with User’s
No
No
BENDO’s data
Decision Making Routines
is not easy for
users to access.
Comprehensibility
No
No
Data is not
standardized.
Recommendations: TMD should simplify and standardize
BENDO data. TMD should provide this information on the
internet.

F. Discloser Embeddedness
Discloser embeddedness occurs when user decisions are
communicated to disclosers, causing disclosers to adjust their
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behavior.138 In the case of the BENDO, the desired behavioral
change is risk reduction. The media have played a role in
broadcasting the BENDO to disclosers. For instance, Bayer
Corporation stated that it is affected by the media attention and
has adjusted its practices accordingly.139 However, this is not a
sustainable pathway of communication between users and
disclosers. TMD should provide a method for tracking user
decisions and making this information available publically. One
such solution would be to solicit users to fill out a survey
indicating their decisions and preferences.
Table 8: Disclosure Embeddedness
Ideal Type Category
Interview Document
Analysis
Disclosers have access to Somewhat N/A
user decisions and alter
behavior in response to
user decisions.

Summary

Media play a role
in broadcasting
BENDO to
disclosers.
BENDO does not
provide a
communication
pathway for
disclosers to
access user
decision making.
Recommendation: TMD should solicit user decisions and make
them publically available.

G. Feedback and Evaluation Mechanism
The BENDO lacks a formal evaluation formal feedback and
evaluation mechanism. Neither users nor disclosers are solicited
for feedback. In addition the BENDO has not been formally
reviewed and evaluated since its inception in 2006. TMD should

138. Id.
139. Telephone Interview with Geoff Bowman, supra note 127.
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implement a formal feedback and evaluation mechanism and use
it to inform policy revisions.
Table 9: Feedback and Evaluation Method
Ideal Type Category
Interview Document
Analysis
Feedback solicited from
No
No
Disclosers and Users

Summary

TMD has no
feedback
mechanism for
the BENDO
Policy is internally
No
No
TMD has no
reviewed and revised
review
mechanism for
the BENDO
Recommendation: TMD should implement a feedback and
evaluation mechanism to inform policy revisions to the BENDO.

H. Involvement of User Groups
The BENDO has attracted the attention of academics,
national media, and scholarly institutes. These user groups have
helped to publicize the BENDO and bring it to the attention of
the regulated community and concerned citizenry.
TMD
maintains contact with user groups such as the Woodrow Wilson
Institute’s Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies (PEN), and the
University of San Francisco’s Program on Reproductive Health
and the Environment.140 Although these groups have been
concerned with the BENDO’s implications as a regulatory policy,
they have not been involved in translating the data that the
BENDO has collected.141 Although the BENDO regulatory policy
has been publicized, the facility submittals have not been
simplified or synthesized.142 Hence, TMD should solicit user
groups who can simplify and distribute such data to the public.

140. Interview with Nabil Al-Hadithy, supra note 116.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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Table 10: Involvement of User Groups
Ideal Type Category
Interview Document
Analysis
User Groups are
Yes
N/A
supported

[Vol. 30
Summary

BENDO
conducts
outreach and
works
cooperatively
with user
groups.
Policy is publicized
Yes
Yes
BENDO is
widely
publicized by
user groups.
Complex data is
No
N/A
No data has
translated
been translated
by user groups.
Recommendation: TMD should solicit and create relationships
with user groups that have experience simplifying data for the
general public.

I.

Extent to Which Existing Regulatory Programs are
Leveraged

TMD implements a number of environmental programs. As a
certified unified program agency, TMD is responsible for
regulating facilities that handle hazardous materials and
hazardous waste. All of the facilities regulated by the BENDO
are also permitted for managing hazardous materials or
hazardous waste. Because of this overlap, TMD leverages its
environmental programs to support the BENDO. TMD saves
resources, called unified inspection, by conducting simultaneous
inspections at facilities for all of the programs it regulates; the
BENDO is incorporated into this inspection process. The City’s
administrative enforcement process described earlier is another
example of how the BENDO leverages other environmental
programs.
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Table 11: Extent to Which Other Regulatory are Leveraged
Ideal Type Category
Interview Document
Summary
Analysis
Existing regulatory
Yes
Yes
CUPA programs
programs are leveraged
are leveraged
Leveraged programs fill
Yes
Yes
Administrative
deficiencies
Enforcement
program is
leveraged.
Leveraged programs
Yes
Yes
Staff resources
save resources
are saved by
conducting
unified
inspections.
Recommendations: none

V. CONCLUSION
Overall, the BENDO has many elements of a practical ideal
transparency policy. In order to fully implement a successful
transparency policy model, the City of Berkeley should focus on
creating a formalized and standardized approach to correcting the
deficiencies identified in this study.
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APPENDIX A
Instrument A: Focused Interview Questions
For City of Berkeley Government Agencies
Interviewee(s) Identified: Nabil Al-Hadithy
City of Berkeley Toxics Management Manager
1. Please describe your institutional affiliation and the
type of work that you do with your organization.
2. Probe: How does nanotechnology fit into your work?
3. How do you decide what constitutes a nanoparticle?
4. Probe: Why should these materials should be
disclosed?
5. How important are existing government programs in
determining how the regulation was implemented?
For example, existing infrastructure, cooperation
between regulatory agencies, state resources, etc.?
6. How do you see government mandates, legal issues, or
program requirements affecting what you can do?
7. What is your regulatory authority?
8. Do you offer any interpretation of what the data might
mean to the end user? Please describe.
9. Describe the reasons for instituting the BENDO.
10. Probe: Did the lack of currently available information
on nanotechnology constitute a public risk?
11. How does the BENDO mitigate this risk?
12. Describe the review and approval process once the
disclosure report is received.
13. Are variable results acceptable?
14. What are the mechanisms by which end-users access
information?
15. How many information requests have you had since
the regulation was enacted?
16. How many information requests do you receive in a
month, in a year?
17. What percentage of information requests come from
individuals, NGOs, consultants, litigators, etc.?
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18. How long does it take end users to receive information
once requested?
19. How are requests for information processed?
20. How does the BENDO integrate other regulatory
policies to achieve its desired outcome?
21. How does the City of Berkeley Toxics Management
Division (TMD) address non-compliance?
22. What enforcement resources does TMD employ?
23. How is the regulation funded?
24. Is the funding sustainable?
25. Who are the end users of the data/information?
26. What impact do you think your disclosure policy has
had on the public? What are the most important ways
in which these studies get communicated to the
public—through media, government outreach, NGO
activities, etc.?
27. Probe: Do you have an outreach program that informs
the public how to access BENDO information?
Explain.
28. Who are the intended users?
29. Probe: Do users have the will, capacity, and cognitive
tools to improve their choices through BENDO
information? Explain.
30. How are disclosers identified?
31. What is the relationship between the users and the
disclosers?
32. Probe: Explain how BENDO influences the decisions
of users and disclosers in the following areas:
a. Risk assessment
b. Risk mitigation
c. Commercial manufacturing
d. Economic decisions
33. Describe the methods of communication between the
regulatory agency and the regulated community.
34. How is outreach conducted to the regulatory
community?
35. How are trade secrets protected?
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36. What is the security policy for confidential
information?
37. Probe: Describe other policies that minimize economic
disincentives to disclosers.
38. How does TMD insure that information is
comprehensible to users?
39. What is the role of intermediaries, if any?
40. What user group(s) access the BENDO data?
41. Probe: Does the BENDO data contribute to the goals
of the user group(s)? Explain.
42. Does TMD have a feedback and evaluation
mechanism? Describe.
43. What metrics are taken into account?
44. How are metrics recorded?
45. What types of data analysis is being conducted
currently or will be conducted in the future?
46. Has regulatory policy influenced behavioral changes
in disclosers? Explain.
47. That’s it for my questions. Do you have anything to
add or do you have any specific question for me?

APPENDIX B
Instrument B: Focused Interview Questions
For Private Industry
Interviewee(s) Identified: Geoff Bowman
Bayer Corporation Health and Safety Chief
1. Please describe your institutional affiliation and the
type of work that you do with your organization.
2. Probe: How does nanotechnology fit into your work?
3. How do you see government mandates, legal issues, or
program requirements affecting what you can do?
4. Do you believe the BENDO will assist in risk
assessment for the following end users?:
a. The Government
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b. The Public
5. What kind of influence, if any (and how much), do you
think nanoparticle disclosure policy is having or will
have on the production decisions of industry?
6. Describe the methods of communication between you
and the TMD.
7. What costs does the BENDO impose?
8. Do you have any concerns regarding trade secret
information? Explain.
9. Has your management of engineered nanoparticles
changed as a result of the BENDO? Explain.
10. Probe: In relation to risk reduction risks or improve
performance?
11. That’s it for my questions. Do you have anything to
add or do you have any specific question for me?
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